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Equity, Efficiency, and the Distribution of He1lth Care• 
by 
Samuel Gorovitz 
We spend a stunning amount on health care. That amount ls soaring, and 
there seems no end in sight .. Yet a significant portion of the American public suffers 
from poor health, and a different, but overlapping segment of the American public 
receives poor health care, or none. The vast sums that are spent on high technology 
medicine not only benefit just a small number of patients, but do so in waya that 
raise new and troubling moral dilemmas. Nearly everyone agrees that our total sys­
tem of heal th care delivery - including the distribution of costs and benetlta .:- la 
not in excellent health, in spite of our large investment In It. There is a fair amount 
of agreement about the symptoms, a scant amount about the diagnosis, and next 
to none about the treatment. Complicating our attempts to set the matter right 
is the fact that we want our expenditures to be used efficiently, and we believe In, 
or at least say we believe in, equity as a value to be reflected ln the functioning of 
all our social arrangements. But we are not very clear about what efficiency and 
equity are. And we have· barely begun to consider the relationship between these 
two notions in the specific context of our concerns about contalnln1 the cotta of 
health care. 
I will look first, and separately, at the notions of efficiency and of equity, 
then at the relationship between them, and finally, briefly, at a few of the luues 
that arise • we apply these notions tn the context of health care. Fint, however, 
I want to acknowledge several related propositions about health care that atrike 
me as unassailable. 
(1) The medical care of individuals at pretent has remarkably little to do 
with the� level of health of the population. 'Ille factors that most tnftuence health 
are stress, diet, sanitation,, environmental pollutants, self-destructive habits, and the 
Uke. But in medicine, as in st> many other dimensions of life, the drama, glory, and 
money are in response to eris�. not in avoidance of it. So health care is primarily 
me�cal care - response to illness or injury - and the maintenance and nurturance 
ot health take second pla�e t<Hts restoration as the objective of health· care. Of 
course, whatever the succes8 of preventative public health measures, there will 
always be a need for medical care. In fact, 
· 
(2) The demand for. medical care ls potentially llmitleu. The more succeufw 
we are at curing people and keeping them alive, the greater the demand for medical 
care will be. 'Ibis is especially true with chronically ill and geriatric patlenta. The 
longer they live, the more medical care they tend to require. Thus an lncreue in 
the quality and supply of medical care will not tend to diminish, limit, or meet 
the demand. In this respect, medical care is like education, and unlike almost every­
thing else. Therefore, 
1 (3) There is no identifiable "adequate level" of inve.tment in medical care; 
the demand can absorb any increase in expenditure no matter what the level of 
that increase. ThiB is not mainly due to the highly visible fact that pbyslclam 
largely wish to live lite the aristocracy so many of tli�m view themselves 11 
constituting, nor bec&U$e of the frequently touted inefficiency in the organiza­
tion and administration of our medical institutions. Physicians are not alone tn 
being well paid, they often work hard and well to eam their Incomes - In spite 
s 
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of the continuing exposure of far too many instances of egregious greed - and 
in any case It <Bl readily be shown that physician,s fees, though high, are not the 
main ingredient in rising costs. Furt'1er, hospital inefficiency, though sometimes 
outrageous, is surely no more outrageous than the inefficiency in any other large 
and complex social organization - such as the railway system, the postal system, 
the GSA, or any state university. The potential limitlessness of medical costs is 
more because we will always want to learn more from me<li:cal research, because 
high technology medicine, along with its dazzling price tags, will continue to be­
come increasingly accepted as the standard of optimal medical care, because social 
pressures increasingly force physicians to practice a more costly sort of defensive 
medicine, and because eventual illness and injury will be with us always. 
(4) The business of health care is government. business to a large extent, and 
the government is in that business to stay. People argue about the proper role of 
government in regard to medical matters, but no one can credibly predict - imd few 
people would really want- much of a diminution of that role. 
(6) It is no.t true that "when you've got your health, you've got just about 
everything." Health is only one of the many things we care about, and often it is 
not even the most important to us. The point does not rest· on chronic indolence, 
dietary self-indulgence, or other imprudent behavior. People knowingly and will­
ingly undergo risk and suffer injury and sometimes lllness for the sake of.service 
to others, creative achievement, or a sense of accomplishment. And why should 
they nqt? 
Having made these background remarks, I tum to questions surrounding 
equity and efficiency. 
When we speak of efficiency, we tend to do so in a way that reflects the 
usage of that notion in physics. There, efficiency is a calculable ratio - the ratio 
of work input to work output - which approaches the value one as a limiting and 
unachievable ideal. Every machine has an efficiency, every efficiency is a number, 
and any two efficiencies can therefore be compared. But when we leave the realm 
of physics, we leave its precision behind. Our talk of efficiency in other contexts 
suffers from the tempting but false assumption that it is still a precise notion, 
quite serviceable .for making quantitative decisions. And it doesn,t help to dress 
the old notion of efficiency up In the fancy new clothes of cost-benefit or cost­
effectiveness language. 
Consider.this lllustratlon. Two automobile engines are mounted on a bench. 
Engine A, which can propel a two-ton car for twenty five m1les on a gallon of 
gasoline, hums smoothly on the bench. Engine ·B, in contrast, can propel a two­
ton car only for fifteen miles on one gallon of the same gasoline at the same speed. 
It sits on the bench, clattering and sputtering, whistling and clanging. Which is the 
more efficient engine? So long as It is propelling cars that is at issue, of course 
Engine A is more efficient. But if I tell you that I am a movie producer at work 
on the sound track of a film about antique automobiles, and that what I am after 
is the most automotive engine clatter I can get per gallon, then it is obviously 
Engine B that is more efficient. 
The point should be clear enough. Implicit in any use of the notion of 
efficiency Is an assumption about what the desired outcome is. In classical physics, 
it ls well defined. In ordinary discoune about cars, It is contextually lmplled. In 
the example of the two engines, it was hidden at first, and perhaps surprising when 
revealed. 
When we talk about efficiency in health care, what exactly are the values and 
the output producta i� terms of which - and enly in terms.of which - we can 
4 
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make sense of claims about efficiency? We have not answered this question in any 
adequate way. But until we can reach some clarity about what the output objectives 
of medical care are to be, we cannot usefu1ly make more than impressionistic judg­
ments about efficiency. 
Lest it be thought that the answer is clear enough, except to the fussing of 
the philosopher, let me illustrate: 
(1) It an Investment by a hospital in one of those infamous CAT scanners 
saves 30 additional lives a year, is it an efficient investment as compared with 
endowing a community diagnostic program that could improve the health of hun· 
dreds of people? 
(2) Is a mu lti-million dollar public immunization program an efficient invest· 
ment of health care dolla!l'S if it protects most of the population at risk against an 
epidemic of unknown likelihood? 
These questions are not clear yet hard to answer. Rather, the questions them· 
selves are unclear. They utilize a notion of efficiency which is not well defined or 
wen understood. 
· 
Regarding the first example: we oft�n spend a great deal to save the life of 
an identified person. We are less likely to Invest in the statistical saving of lives -
to incur expenses that will save the lives of persons unspecified. Sometimes, how­
ever, we invest heavily to that end - for instance, in the establishment of a shock­
trauma unit or in a hospital's acquisition of a hyperbaric chamber. Yet we do not 
make all the investments that would surely save lives, in part pecause we are not 
sure how important to us it is to save an the lives it is medically possible to save. 
But unless we know how much a life is worth to us, how can we judge the efficien­
cy of an investment that saves the life? Further, it is impossible to compare such 
an investment with one that proJides non-vital medical care without understanding 
what value we place on good health. It is not obvious, anyway, that we clearly 
favor saving a tew lives over substantially improving the well-being of a large num­
ber of people. 
Reg�ding the seCOJ?.d example: the problem is not just one of empirical un­
certainty about the epidemic and its severity. It is partly an uncertainty about how 
important it is to relieve anxiety and about what the prevention of symptoms is 
worth. 
These questions, of course, are not for philosophy to answer alone. They.are 
problems of social decision, the answers to which must be fashioned by all those 
whose risk and whose resources are involved. Further, the question of what to take 
as the appropriate objective in terms ot which to evaluate etficiency is itself a ques­
tion of value on which considerations of equity can have bearing. 
It is time, then, to tum to equity - what common usage and the dictionary 
both take as equivalent to justice, fairness, doing the right thing. There are various 
competing views of what constitutes equity. One prominent view is that equity is 
or requires equality. What might that mean in the context of the distribution of 
health care? There are at least these choices: 
(1) Equality in the dollar e�penditure on each indiuidual. This interpretation 
makes little sense. Some lucky people just don't need health care; they thrive until 
they die, and there isn't anything to spend their health care dollars on. Perhaps w� 
could approximate to equal expenditure by adopting a plan invented, I think, by 
D.m Callahan, whereby each person is allowed some fixed amount - say $100,000 -
over his lifetime, with a refund of any unused portion to go to his estate. 
(2) Equality in the state of health of each individual. The problem here is 
that this sort of equality is impossible no matter what we spend or how. Some 
6 
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people enjoy robust health, some are sickly or worse all their lives, and we have 
only limited leverage on the natural distribution of physiological characteristics. 
(3)Equality in the maximum to which each indiuidual is benefited. This would 
mean that each person bas equal aooess to medical care up to some limit, to he 
drawn on as needed, with no pretense of equalizing actual expenditures. We may 
find th IS becoming a position tO be taken Seriously I tboug� the queatlon Of What 
sorts of limits should be set is just beginning to rear Its vexsome head. 
(4) Equality in the treatment ·of like cti8es. Under this interpretation, a na-' 
tlonal health service, for example, could have a program in renal dialysis, treatine 
u needed all medically qualified cases. At the same time, it could refuse to treat 
cues of hemophilia at all - arguing that such an exclusion was necessary on 
grounds of economy, and going on to claim that the health care was wholly equit· 
able, thoroughly equal, ·1n the sense' that each person had eq.ual claim on such treat­
ments as were made available. Both the patient with kidney failure and the hemo· 
phyllac woUld have equal access to dialysis as needed according to this plan. 
So if we interpret equity as equality in some sense or other, we Immediately 
face problems of interpretation. Each Interpretation, moreover, ls problematic. It 
is not clear, nor unchallenged, that any sort of egalitarian interpretation of equity 
ls tenable. First, there ls the problem of scarcity. There will always be medical 
treatments Ol' ·supplies in short supply - at least the ones that have just been 
d�veloped. How are we to achieve equality here, except by a lottery that provides 
not equal treatment, but an equal chance of getting treatment? Second, there la 
the problem of entitlement. Consider the research scientist who has devoted his 
life to the search for a vaccine that ls effective aP.inst a disease that has slaughtered 
his ancestors for generations. N�w he has the vaccine, but initially in shQrt supply. 
Are we to deny his claim on 8' dose for himaelf or his child beca1Jse that would vio· 
lat& our commitment to equ'il access? Many would argue that he has an entitlement 
that sets him apart from the rest; that to deny it would itself be to abandon our 
commitment to equity. 
So equity, like efficiency - although tor different reuons - ia an elusive 
notion. We rely on them both in the rhetoric that surrounds the defense of policy, 
and we rely on our Intuitions about them in the setting and advocacy .of policy. 
But when it eomes· to a specific case of defending a policy under �fui scrutiny, 
these notion4 slip 8Wf3 from precise clarification. What, then, is to be said .tor them? 
One way to Interpret the notion of efficiency - a way that seems to corres· 
pond well with the way we actually use it - is as a measu're of the extent to which 
an action produces good - where goo(l is itself defined as the satlsfactlo� of human 
needs and desires. Th.at action, program or policy then is the most efficient which, 
at a ifven level of ex�nditure,. is the one among all available alternatives that maxi­
mizes good. Comparative judgments are then possible to the degree to which we 
have a clear conception of what l's good, and also a clear account of what conse­
quences Wm flow from the various acts we contemplate. 
This is classical utilitarianism, an<l moral philosophy tor the last century, 
like economics and Anglo-American legislative policy over the same century; bas 
been dominated by the influence of utilitarian theory. The objections to it are 
numerous and powerful, but· Its appeal ls nonetheless unsurpassed as an account 
of· what we ought to do, individually and collectively, and why. Tbli appeal rests 
ultimately In the simple fact that we do care about the satiSfactlon of human w.ants 
and needs - about the production of good ..;,. and we therefore want ou.r efforts and 
our resources to produce as much of it as possible. This want translates into our 
concern with efficiency. 
6 
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Equity is a more obviously moral notion. It means justice, fairness in our 
dealings with one another. But how are we to understand what is just? Here, again, 
there is a historical tradition of thought to guide us. From the ancient Pythagorean 
rules of conduct and the ten commandments, through the austere moral strictures 
of Immanuel Kant, to an extensive body of antiutilitarian moral theory, we have 
nurtured and sustained a sense that some kinds of actions are right and other kinds 
are wrong, regardless of t!he consequences they lead to or the ends they serve, 
simply because of the kinds of acts they are. Thus we condemn the framing of an 
innocent man, no matter how great the social benefits of the conviction might be, 
just as we condemn torture, slavery, and other moral abominations without regard 
to the role they may play in the larger pursuit of noble ends. Or, at least, all of us 
do except the most intransigent of the hard-core utilitarians. And we do so not 
because such actions strike us as inefficient in the production of good, but because 
they violate our sense of justice. 
Providing an account of that sense of justice is no small task. But it does seem 
that Mill's view that justice is derivative from considerations of U!tility, of efficiency 
in the production of good results, is in decline. Recent moral philosophy ha$ shown 
reluctance to consider justice as a derivative concept. Rather, it has come to be 
largely viewed as a dimension of morality that is separate from and independent of 
utility, and which can therefore be in conflict with it. 
Efficiency as a value thus reflects our concern with the maximum produc· 
tion of good, and equity as a value reflects our concern with doing what is just or 
fair, regardless ·of its efficiency. In an ideal world, these values would never be in 
conflict, but in fact the conflict is notorious. We may want both equity and ef­
ficiency, but at least sometimes one may be purchased only at the cost of the 
other. ? 
To see the conflict between equity and efficiency etched sharply, consider a 
hypothetical example. Real cases, if they are interesting, involve complexity of the 
sort that can obscure a simple point; I use an artificial example, just as the physi· 
cist does when he speaks. of the frictionless plane. Imagine that we .are all on a 
desert island, struggling to survive. Most of us cluster into a village, but a few set 
out for. remote parts of the island where the fishing is perhaps better. There is little 
rain, so drinking water is a constant problem; there is just marginally enough to 
keep us alive. Suddenly, a rescue mission fiies overhead. Usi!ng remote sensing 
technology, they assess our situation. They depart, then return with a large crate 
which they parachute to the island. We open the crate and find a tank truck filled 
with pure water and a message that the water Is for all the people on the island. How 
shall we distribute the water? 
There are 100 people on the island; 1000 gallons in the tank. Specify what­
ever distribution you think is equitable. You can favor ten gallons per person, or 
more for those who work more, or most for those in positions of authority - it 
doesn't matter which distribution you favor as most equitable. For you now dis­
cover that the tank truck has a steam engine. In order to move it around at all you 
have to use water. And the conflict between efficiency and equity - however you 
construe equity - becomes plain. Assuming that each gallon of water is as valuable 
to each person as any other gallon - that is, there is no diminishing marginal util­
ify of water in the range of. quantities at issue - then the most efficient thing to 
do is not use the engine at all. Let water go to those who come for it - to the alie­
bodied who live nearby. The weak, the ill, the aged, the distant will get none, but 
since there is linearity in the good produced by incremental allocations of water,. 
their deprivation is of no consequence, for we produce more good this way than 
7 
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by spending some of the water on operating the delivery truck. It would be hard 
to argue that justice is served, however, especially given that the water was sent to 
all. the people on the island. . 
So equity costs something. In some situations the most efficient action and 
the moat equitable action are not the same. Some balance must then be struck 
between thtt two competing values. For one who places justice above all, consid· 
erations of efficiency may legitimately come Into play, but only after justice is 
fully served. This position would be exemplified by the egalitarian who insisted 
on an equal distribution of water to all island inhabitants, even lf most of the water 
were used by delivering it. But he could still be seriously concerned with mapping 
the best route, in order to conserve water, and thus to distribute it most efficiently 
within the constraints of equity. He would be the mirror Image of the complete 
utilitarian who advocated making the decision solely on the grounds of efficiency 
and therefore leaving the truck in place. For many people, myself among them, 
some middle ground is best - some approximation to complete equity, tempered 
by an unwillingness to let efficiency fall too low. 
I have not shown, of course, that equity and efficiency are always in conftict -
only that they are competing values in some situations. It is a separate question 
whether the kinds of situations that arise in regard to the distribution of health 
care are of the sort In which equity and efficiency an in conflict. But the answer 
is apparent.; one example should suffice to show that the conflict is present. 
Assume that considerations of equity - of justice or fairness in the treatment 
c:l. persons - require that each individual be free to choose t°he geographical location 
in which he or she will seek work. Assume further that considerations of equity 
require that in an affluent industraliud nation like ours a minimally decent level 
of health care should be available to all citizens, including those In poor, rural com­
munities. Finally, assume that our concern with containing the costs of·health care 
places llmlta on the amount of financial Incentive we can provide to induce phy­
sicians to pra�tlce In otherwise undesirable? locations .. Then the confiict is evident: 
we can resolve the problem only by some sacrifice in the freedom of the physician. 
the health care of the poor, or the pocketbook of the public. And any such aacri· 
fice will be to some extent a �oncesslon with respect either to equity or efficiency. 
Having argued that equity and efficiency, however we interpret them, are 
different and competing values, I want to tum next to some further questions of 
health care distribution and cost containment. 
Since health is not the only thing we care about - nor should it be - we want 
to have substantial resources available for other expenditures. It may, therefore, 
seem obvious that we ought to decide how much to spend on health care, and also 
how it should be spent. It would be a mistake, however, to think that any such 
determination takes place in any systematic or comprehensive way. Rather, what 
we spend on health care is the total of the expenditures in diverse sectors ranging 
from the indlv .ldual buying a bottle of useless cold pills or a much needed bandage 
to the government building a useless new 21 million dollar Navy hospital in New 
Orleans or purChaslng essential medical care for a large class of people in need. 
There simply ls no coherent, organized or regulated arraneem-ent regarding how 
much is spent, what it is spent on, or bow care is distributed. Nor is there much 
effective coordination among the various sectors of health care activity. Therefore 
there is no overall determination of a total level of expenditure - indeed, we know 
only approximately what the total expenditUie is. And there is no systematic con· 
trot ovef the ways in which the funds are spent. Any approach to health care dis­
tribution or cost contain�ent must therefore be piecemeal, addressing individual 
8 
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aspects of the health care landscape one locale at a time. 
If we are speaking of a single individual or family, it is relatively easy to say 
how to keep costs down: live prudently, carry a good medical insurance program, 
and be an alert, informed, active and critical consumer of health care services. Then, 
most probably, the costs of health care will be reasonably well contained. But 
that by itself will not relieve the rising costs associated with high technology medi· 
cine nor will it keep insurance costs from rising beyond the reach of increasingly 
many people. For the problem is·not fundamentally one of individual choice and 
action; it is one of a cumulative financial effect that can· only be addressed, how­
ever piecemeal, by collective response - that is, as a matter of public policy. 
Governmental expenditure on health care is approximately 75 billion dollars 
a year, and th� government role is exceedingly diverse. The government functions: 
(1) As direct provider of care. Example: the Veterans Administration's sys­
tem of nearly 200 hospitals, for which the 1978 fiscal year budget appropriation 
for medical care is over 4. 7 billion dollars. 
(2) As prouider of medical insurance. Example: the Medicare and Medicaid 
programs, through which the government is the largest provider of medical insur­
ance in the coi.mtry. 
(3) As the operator of support systems for health care research and delivery. 
Example: the National Center for Disease Control in Atlanta. 
(4) As a medical educator. Example: the Uniformed Services University of 
the Health Sciences. 
(5) As a supporter of medical education: Example: capitation grants to med· 
ical, nursing, and allied health professional schools. 
(6) As a sponsor and operator of medical research programs. Example: the 
National Institutes of Health. ' · 
(7) As a regulator of persons, substances, and institutions. Example: rulings 
by the Food and Drug Administration. And finally, 
(8) As an indirect influence on health care. Example: OSHA regulations, 
automobile safety standards, EPA rulings, and the like. 
:Each of ·these functions is itself diverse, and each thus provides a complex 
context of expenditure wherein questions of efficiency and of equity can be raised. 
Further, the government's regulatory and legislative powers will play a crucial role 
in any collective response to the problems associated with cost containment. So 
the government is the central figure in the story. 
Any consideration of containing costs must deal with problems of distribu· 
tlon and supply, among others. Basically, there are just two possibilities for contain· 
ine cost.s: one- can limit or reduce service, or one can limit or reduce the cost for 
the average instance of service. One way to reduce or limit service is to distribute 
lt only to a limited portion of those cases where a need is present. 
The reduction of service is also possible, however, through the redefinition 
of need. We can increase or diminish the claims for health care services by broad­
ening or narrowing the definitions of illness, without thereby affecting anyone 
medically. If our clinics are too crowded, we can thin the crowds by a decision 
that although people with dandruff, obesity, bizarre noses, and lackadaisical libido 
"-Y have problems, they are not necessarily sick, and do not qualify to make dalma 
on the health care facilities. The closer we move toward putiic:zlly funded health 
care or health care insurance, the more critical it will become to clarify what is to 
count as illness for purposes of claiming entitlement to health care resources. 
Now consider the notion of limiting costs by leaving some needs unmet. 
Recall specifically those inevitably cited patients with kidney failure. In the early 
9 
8
Philosophic Exchange, Vol. 10 [1979], No. 1, Art. 7
http://digitalcommons.brockport.edu/phil_ex/vol10/iss1/7
Equi�, Efficiency, and the Distribution of Health Caie 
days of renal dialysis, we had a classic problem of allocating limited vital resources. 
There were not enough machines to go around. That problem is now essentially 
past, but a similar situation exists with respect to live organ transplants. Many more 
patients are medically qualified to receive transplanted kidneys than can be accom­
modated given the present rate of supply. How shall we respond to this situation? 
Various principles of distribution come to mind. Consider: 
(1) To each according to his means. This is a free market policy. Kidneys go 
to those who can afford them, with the price determined by market phenomena. 
(2.) To each according to his social utility. This is roughly the approach 
adopted In the original dlaliysls selection in Seattle, where an assessment was made 
of the socJal utility of the applicants. It Is the utilitarian approach, the one that 
seeks to maximize efficiency. 
(3) To each according to his entitlement or status. A policy like this might 
favor veterans, landowners, members of the party in power, or other groups or 
individuals making special claims . 
. (4) To each according to his luck. This is the policy of the strict egalitarian: 
count every medically qualified individual as an equal, and draw lots to determine 
who will get the kidneys. 
(5) To each according to his need. To Implement this .policy, of course, re­
quires an increase in the supply of the �esource the scarcity of which presents the 
problem in th·e first place. 
· The choice among these distributional policies will be difficult because our 
values do not �l point to a single choice. In particular, we are sympathetic both to 
considerations of social utility and to .the desirability of meeting everyone's need 
where we have the ability to meet anyone's. So there is a pressure to increase ser-
.vice to meet demand, thereby to eliminate some of the confiict we feel, and that 
yields pressure to increase the supply of transplantable kidneys while keeping a lid 
on the costs. Is there any possibility of doing that'? 
ABC ·news reported in the Autumn of 1978 that recent legislation in France 
makes a pe�on 's organs available at death for transplantation unless the individual 
has exercised ·a prior option of objection. Should we adopt a similar policy? The 
government could go a step beyond France, requiring organ donation without op­
tion of prior objection. Or it could go two steps beyond, drafting people into a 
nation.al organ bank battalion. These people might be selected if they are in good 
health, late in life and of low social utility. They would then be required to donate 
one kidney, with the rest of their organs to be taken at death. The French policy is 
moderate in the context of what is possible. Still, it  is seen as overly coercive by 
many critics. Milder measures include a proposal made recently by an officer of 
the American Kidney Foundation, who suggested that each individual agree or 
decline at the time of registration with the Social Security Administration. But 
Sidney Wolfe, of the Health Research Group, responded that any such association 
with a government agency that provides vital support services could be implicitly 
coercive. Still milder measures are available, however. The government could decide 
to support the present system of total voluntarism with a campaign �imed at per­
suading large numbers of people to become donors. Or the government could leave 
the matter wholly to the workings of the private sector. 
For an illuminating comparison, consider briefly a different problem. We pro­
vide military manpower in various ways at various times depending not only on 
our national security needs but also on our moral priorities. The dr�t, favored In 
wartime, is the most efficient way to provide the manpower, especially combined 
with selective deferment. The government conscripts soldiers, paying what it decides 
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to pay- thereby containing payroll costs, and exempting those whose greater 1oclal 
utility Iles elsewhere - thereby maximizing social efficiency. The principle-ls: from 
each according to his �e{ulness. But.this policy ls criticized on grounds of equity. 
It sends the poor and underprivileged off to· battle, favoring further �he already 
favored, while the benefit of national defense - that is, the security of the nation -
is equally enjoyed by all. Moved by conscience to provide military manpower more 
equitably, we change to a lottery. Now the principle Is: from each according to his 
luck In an equal risk lottery. But this policy has critics, for it obliterates the free. 
dom of the unlucky draftee, as well as reducing efficiency by dratting some who 
would be more usefully placed elsewhere. So out of respect for personal liberty, we 
move to a volunteer service. From each accordirzg to his choice. Freedom is honored, 
but the costs soar because the Incentive to join ls not great for most people in a rea· 
aonably sound economy. And now we hear lamentation from the Pentagon: we 
have liberty, but the price .ls getting beyond our reach, and the efficiency is low. 
So once again we may move to another system, striking a different balance among 
the competing values of efficiency, equality and liberty.· · 
A parallel situation exists in regard to kidney supply and distribution. The 
various plans clearly exhibit different degrees of respect for different values. A 
plausible utilitarian case can be made for the very coercive plans to increase supply, 
and as we move through the shadings of coercion from a draft or universal require· 
ment, to coercion of varying degrees, to persµaslon, education, and voluntarism, 
the level of efficiency seems to drop. At the same time � the level of equity in the 
treatment of penons seems to rise, especially if we take equity to require respect 
for personal autonomy and the bodily integrity of individual persons. But now a 
curious bind seems to emerge. For if the most equitable policy for distribution re­
quires meeting the needs of all patients who require transplants, that policy also 
seems to require, as a practical -lnatter, a highly efficient policy for obtaining trans· 
plantable kidneys. Yet the policies that seem most efficient ln this regard seem 
least equitable from the point of view of potential donon. 'nlus we see equity not 
only in opposition to efficiency, but to equity itself. 
We need to sustain a systematic inquiry into the considerations of equity and 
efficiency in health care, and as part of that process we need a more sophisticated 
understanding of how to assess the value of the outcomes that health care provides. 
This is particularly important as our concern with cost containment heightens, for 
although the crisiB in health care costs is not primarily a government spending crisis, 
only the government is in any position to get real leverage on the currents of supply 
and distribution of health care goods and services. And when we look to govern· 
ment to solve large scale social problems, we should remember that we are looking 
to a ponderous and unpredictable force, mighty in itself, yet subject to the shifting 
drifts of political sentiment. We are well advised to understand what we are asking 
it to do. 
My own view ls that we have a tendency to weigh efficiency too heavily in 
its conflict with equity, in part - but only ln part - because .of the difficulty of 
measuring the value of considerations of equity. Perhaps the basic mistake is to 
assume that the kind of assessment needed can be measurement at all, as opposed 
to the informed and sensitive judgment that lies at the heart of leadership and 
statesmanship. 
One final example: imagine a large family next door. They treat all their 
children well except the youngest. Tb.at one is neglected, disdained - an outcast. 
We would, I think, judge that family harshly, accepting as a mark of its degree of 
decency the way it treats the one whom it treats least well. John Rawls, in A 
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Theory of Justice, argues that equity requires us to use a similar criterion in judg­
ing social institutions. The keystone of his theory is respect for liberty conjoined 
with concern for the least advantaged among us. Those who suffer from debilitat­
ing illness or handicap are, in an important sense, the least advantaged among us, 
and we neglect them at our own moral risk. There ls no way to assign a dollar value 
to such considerations, and they may in tragic circumstances even be defeasible on 
grounds of excessive cost. Nonetheless they have a force that should not be under­
estimated. It may be useful to keep Rawls' criterion in mind as a prima facie con­
straint oo our pursuit of efficiency. That constraint would prevent us from assessing 
health ca.re policies in a purely utilitarian WS"J or in a way that excludes the interests 
of any segment of the population. It would not by itself determine what policies 
we should set, but by narrowing the range of choices it would play some role in the 
process. That larger process of setting public policies for health care that are equit­
able and affordable will be more complex even than the systems of supply and 
distribution, and it would be futile to expect any stable resolution of policy to be 
achieved. Rather, there must be a process of assessment and reassessment in the 
public and political forums - an on-going exchange of which the perspectives of 
philosophy are an essential part. 
•1 am grateful to Norman Weissman, Ruth Macklin, and Norman Daniels for 
criticisms of an earlier draft of this essay. They are, of course, wholly innocent in 
respect to its remaining faults. I am also grateful to the Hastings Center, under 
whose ausp ices this work was done with the support of a grant from the National 
Center for Health Services Research, for permission to provide this essay to the 
Philosophic Exchange. 
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